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It has become fashionable to despair at the quality of
African public sector management) Generally the
problem is attributed to the social and political
context within which governmental activities must be
conducted on the continent [see Hyden 1983; Mons
1981; Price 1975]. There is no doubt that the
environment for public management is frequently
inhospitable in Africa.
The environmental argument explains too much,
however, and is thereby unduly pessimistic. It implies
that almost all public sector activities should fail, since
they are all subject to the same unfavourable
environment. As Barbara Grosh has shown, a good
number of indigenously managed Kenyan parastatals
have in fact been successes [Grosh 1987]. The same
can be said for many civil service initiatives. In these
cases African managers have prevailed despite the
inauspicious context within which they worked. Why
and how? The answer is important to the developmental
future of the continent.
In search of the secrets of African managerial success I
am writing the biographies of four Kenyans who have
been particularly effective in their management of
rural development initiatives, that domain of public
activity in which failure is most prevalent [Hirschman
1987; Israel 1987:18-26]. Within their life and career
histories I have found some clues as to why they were
able to breathe success on many of the enterprises
which they led. Of course the resulting insights must be
treated cautiously until they have been verified
through quantitative research on a systematic sample
of managers. I offer them now, not as proven
generalisations, but to promote discussion and to
strengthen our understanding of some of the forms of
managerial behaviour that are at least possible on the
continent.
The four men whom I have studied are: Charles Kibe
Karanja, General Manager of the Kenya Tea
Development Authority from 1970 to 1981; Harris
Mutio Mule, who moved through the ranks of the
Planning Department to become Permanent Secretary
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of the Ministry of Finance from 1980 to 1986; Simeon
Nyachae, Provincial Commissioner from 1964 to
1979, then head of the President's policy staff and
finally Chief Secretary from 1983 to 1986; and Ishmael
Muriithi, Director of Veterinary Services from 1966 to
1984. I have probed the lives of these men in
considerable depth, interviewing them and their
families, professional associates, friends and village
acquaintances. Altogether I conducted nearly 300
interviews with almost 200 people in pursuit of these
biographies.
The four men have varied in the extent and clarity of
their success as public servants. The most unambiguous
case is that of Charles Karanja. The Kenya Tea
Development Authority is an internationally
acknowledged success story [Paul 1982:11, 60-2] and
Karanja saw it through its period of greatest growth,
including itS movement into the new and difficult
areas of manufacturing and international marketing.
The choice of Simeon Nyachae is more controversial.
His service to the President was always impeccable but
some of the enterprises with which he was associated
during his tenure as Provincial Commissioner did not
have a positive developmental impact. (For example,
he was chair of the failed Wheat Board.) A change
gradually overtook him when he assumed responsibility
for national policy, however. Kenya's Financial Times
wrote of his term as Chief Secretary that he:
bestrode the Kenya civil service like the Shakes-
pearean colossus. For most of that period,
Nyachae's influence permeated every department
of government operations and he was the most
articulate exponent of most economic policies .
He was the prime moving force behind the
government's district focus for rural development
programmes and its most lucid spokesman
Kisero 1987:4].
I think that he had a major and, on balance, positive
impact in this period.
Harris Mule was a quieter, less obtrusive man.
Working behind the scenes he was a prime architect of
Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands and District
Focus programmes (the latter with Nyachae). These
were progressive, redistributive programmes. He also
was responsible with Philip Ndegwa, Governor of the
Central Bank of Kenya, for the country's early and
courageous economic readjustment in the 1980s,
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which might be thought of as a conservative policy.
One international observer of Kenya's economic
policies called Mule 'one of the ten best stabilisers in
the world'. Both Kenyans and foreigners agree that he
was exceptionally good at handling donor agencies
and their pressures. Mule's internal management of
the Ministry of Finance was more mixed; he was
criticised for not Africanising rapidly enough and
some departments were not tightly administered.
Ishmael Muriithi presided over a dramatic expansion
in Kenya's veterinary services and with it the
successful explosion of smaliholder dairy production.
His iron mangerial hand turned limp however, when
President Kenyatta died and the expansive public
budgets on which he had relied began to run dry. His
final years were not effective ones.
All of these men were responsible for important
successes, but they had failures as well.2 Thus the
assessment of the managerial attributes of these men
that follows is a subtle one, giving greater weight to
those factors that are associated with the successes and
steering away from those elements that seem to be
responsible for their failures. Given the discriminating
nature of this analysis and the brevity that is necessary
to a Bulletin article, full proof will not always be
possible for the conclusions that are drawn.
Political Connections and Organisational
Autonomy
One of the older pieces of wisdom on public
enterprises is that their effective management requires
political autonomy. Organisations are expected to
prosper to the extent that their leaderships are
appointed for their technical, not their political
qualifications [Hanson 1959]. It is evident from my
case studies that this analysis is over simple.
Although all of my subjects were professionally well
qualified for the positions that they held, their
managerial success and the autonomy of their
organisations was critically dependent on their
political connections.3 In 1973 Charles Karanja
wanted his Kenya Tea Development Authority
(KTDA) to expand vertically into the technically
difficult areas of processing and international
marketing. He was opposed in this decision by the
World Bank, which was KTDA's major financier, and
the multinational tea corporations that were then
handling these functions for the KTDA. As a
consequence, the Minister of Agriculture and his
Permanent Secretary decided firmly against the
expansion. But Karanja would not be stopped. He
sought out an interview with President Kenyatta and
2 Mixed records are characteristic of the great American public
administrators as well: see Diog and Hargrove 1987:12.
lt turns out that this is true in the United States as well: see Doig and
Hargrove 1987:15.
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asked that he be permitted to take on the new
functions and to be fired if he failed. Kenyatta
expressed his high regard for Karanja and gave his
permission. The other actors then withdrew their
opposition and the KTDA successfully assumed these
new roles. This action would not have been possible if
Karanja had not earlier in his career come to the
personal attention of Kenyatta, inspired his confidence
and had direct access to him.
The self-assurance which Karanja's presidential
connections gave him also provided the KDTA with
an impressive degree of autonomy, much more than
was granted to it by its legal charter. Twice in the
1970's the Kenya Government negotiated a Tripartite
Agreement whereby organised labour agreed to a
freeze on wages in return for a lOper cent increase in
employment by private employers and the state. This
agreement proved particularly costly to public
organisations because whereas the private firms
returned to their previous employment
levels relatively quickly through normal attrition in
their labour force, the state increased the numbers of
its established positions and remained permanently
fixed at the higher level. Karanja correctly felt that this
agreement would be disadvantageous to the farmers
whom the KTDA served, as the increased costs would
have to be deducted from the payments made to them.
He felt so confident of his personal standing with the
President that he never implemented the Agreement,
by making seasonal workers permanent. This resulted
in no increase in expenditure and protected the health
of his organisation from a disadvantageous political
decision.
When Kenyatta died Karanja lost his direct contact
with the President, but he was so confident of the
importance of the KTDA and of the quality of his
management that he continued to act with the same
independence and decisiveness. Ultimately this cost
him his position. The dénouement came during a time
of high tea prices on the world market when packaged
tea that Kenya subsidised for its domestic market was
being smuggled to Ethiopia. A Cabinet Minister and
important supporter of President Moi publicly
accused the KTDA of responsibility for the smuggling
and the shortage of tea in his constituency. Stung by
this questioning of the KTDA's integrity, Karanja
held a press conference to point out that the Minister
owned the major shop in his constituency which
received KTDA tea allotments, implying that if there
were smuggling the Minister must be responsible for it
himself. The Minister denied he was an agent for tea.
As Karanja prepared to reply with documentary
evidence of the Minister's role and of smuggling
through Nairobi airport, he sought an audience with
President Moi to brief him on the conflict. The
Minister was able to keep him from seeing the
President, and the Government subsequently took tea
distribution away from the KTDA and instructed it to
divert international supplies to the domestic market,
at the cost of small farmers' profits.4 Although
Karanja wasn't dismissed until some time later, his
effectiveness as a manager was substantially diminished
from this point. He no longer had the contacts
necessary to protect his organisation.
Part of Ishmael Muriithi's job as Director of
Veterinary Services was to protect Kenya's most
productive beef herds from Foot and Mouth Disease
so that they could be sold in the lucrative European
markets. To do this, strict quarantine had to be
imposed on the movement of livestock from the
infected areas into disease free ones. Well placed
individuals would use their influence from time to time
to evade the quarantine and reap the considerable
profits available from the difference in prices in the two
markets. It was particularly difficult for the Veterinary
Department to control the problem when people such
as senior police officials were the culprits. Muriithi
gained the support which he needed to win this critical
struggle by going directly to President Kenyatta. He
did not have personal connections himself with the
President but was able to reach him and gain his
confidence through Geoffrey Kariithi, who then held
the powerful position of Chief Secretary and had been
to high school with Muriithi. This liaison was used by
the Director of Veterinary Services on a number of
occasions to obtain critically needed resources and
support for his department. When Kenyatta died and
Kariithi retired, Muriithi was deprived of his
connections with the Office of the President and was
unable to protect the Veterinary Services from the
conflicts and mindless budget cutting that then
undermined its effectiveness. In his final years as
Director he lost his characteristic vigour and
decisiveness and came near to a despairing lethargy,
probably only partly due to his declining health.
Harris Mule never had personal connections with
those around the President and his ascension to a
permanent secretaryship was delayed partly as a
result. When he finally became Permanent Secretary
to the Ministry of Finance and Planning under
President Moi, he still lacked the direct contacts
necessary to obtain the economic policies he regarded
as critical. He began by working through his Minister,
Vice-President Mwai Kibaki, with whom he had a
long-standing and close relationship. However, this
became less and less effective as Kibaki's political
power began to slip. Mule then allied himself
informally with Simeon Nyachae in the Office of the
President.
Nyachae is one of the few men to have had the
personal confidence of both Presidents Kenyatta and
Moi. This is probably because of Nyachae's principled
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determination always to give priority to the interests
of his Presidents and never to act in a way that might
diminish them, even at the cost of service to his own
home area. Such dogged loyalty gave both Presidents
confidence in the advice that they received from
Nyachae. As a consequence, on one known occasion
Kisii Nyachae was even able to win a showdown with
a senior Kikuyu official who was well connected with
President Kenyatta.
As allies, Mule and Nyachae were able to achieve a
number of important reforms through the President's
trust in the latter. Most remarkable was their ability to
persuade Moi to accept the politically risky conditions
needed for an IMF agreement less than two months
after the major coup attempt of August 1982. The
great strides made under the District Focus strategy
were also a direct result of the three men seeing eye to
eye on the policy. On another occasion, when Mule
pressed for deregulation of the grain market harder
and longer than was politically expedient, it was his
relationship with Nyachae and the latter's ties with the
President that saved Mule from losing office.
In all of these cases we see that the ability of these
public servants effectively to pursue professionally
dictated policies and to protect the integrity of their
organisation against inappropriate political pressures
was directly contingent on their personal connections,
direct or indirect, with the President. When these
relationships of confidence were lost, so was their
managerial effectiveness. Thus we see that the
autonomy of an organisation from undue politicisation
is not something that can simply be granted to it in a
single constitutional act. It has to be earned and then
maintained through political connections. Virtually
all public organisations need favourable policy
decisions and additional resources at critical junctures
if they are to prosper [see Mukandala 1988; Grosh
1987]. They also need protection from unwise policy
initiatives and politicisation. All of these requisites,
even depoliticisation, are achieved as a consequence of
political action. In Kenya and most other African
states, the relevant political intervention comes from
the President.
Effective public servants are able to mobilise support
at critical junctures not by building independent
political bases of support for themselves or their
organisations, but from personal access to and the
confidence of the President. By and large, these crucial
connections were not fortuitous for the four men
studied here. They resulted from loyalty and careful
network building and are a tribute to their
administrative astuteness in an underbureaucratised
environment.5 Thus political considerations are
important in the appointment of the most senior
public servants if political autonomy and effectiveness
are to be maintained.
I owe this observation to Emery Roe.
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ethics were the strictest, and their personal wealth
upon retirement was consequently modest. Karanja
and Nyachae had taxer conceptions and left the public
service rich. Their wealth was due to hard work and
business acumen, however, and probably only to a
minor degree to the positions they had held,
particularly for Karanja.
As long as they take care of their organisations well,
does it interfere with their effectiveness if public
managers use their positions to advance their personal
wealth in Africa? I have concluded that the answer is
yes. Certainly the general political and social
environment of which these men were part was quite
unconcerned about corruption, and effectively
encouraged it. In much the same way as Robert Price
demonstrated for Ghana [Price 1975], the question in
the popular mind was never how someone got their
wealth but whether they were personally transferring
resources to their relatives and home areas. My
interviews revealed, however, that a different set of
values usually prevailed inside public agencies among
the professional subordinates and peers of the
managers I studied. The respect and support that a
manager of a professional organisation received from
his subordinates and from his peers in related
organisations appeared to be heavily contingent on his
perceived personal integrity. This does not mean that
these subordinates and peers were always behaving
with integrity themselves. Unlike members of the
general public, however, they understood the concept
of conflict of interest and felt that they owed effort and
support to those who were faithful to it, even if they
were not. Conversely, they felt free to be slack in their
duties if they were asked to do something by someone
whose integrity they doubted. I am not suggesting that
Kenyan professionals always - or even usually -
practise what they preach, but they do believe what
they preach. Their views on integrity have something
of the same status as American views on marital
fidelity in presidential politics. Even those who do not
practise the ethical code themselves believe that those
who break it do not deserve to hold leadership
positions. Thus in Kenya, those whose integrity is in
doubt are unlikely to be effective managers of
professional organisations. Indeed, the decline in the
careers of two of the managers in our 'sample' can be
traced in part to revelations that they had profited
from minor conflicts of interest.
I have carefully limited the above generalisation about
the relationship between integrity and managerial
effectiveness to professional organisations. Interviews
with Simeon Nyachae's colleagues in the Provincial
Administration did not reveal much concern with the
conflict of interest issue. Quite possibly this part of the
Kenya Government is so closely tied to the regulation
and practice of politics that it has no distinct
professional code of ethics on such matters.
Professional Integrity
Not everyone who has the confidence of a president is
going to use it to advance the performance of the
organisation that he or she leads, however. Those who
come to positions of leadership in Africa through a
political career or because of their ability tomobilise
support in the larger political community are not
likely to be effective managers. They are likely to see
their positions and the powers which they convey as a
reward for the delivery of their support to the
president, not as a resource to be used to advance the
effectiveness of the organisation. Managers with this
type of political support tend to sap, not strengthen
their units.
The effective managers in our 'sample' were committed
professionals. Harris Mule and Ishmael Muriithi were
trained overseas respectively as a professional
economist and veterinarian. Both men were deeply
committed to their profession and dedicated to
maintaining their standards in Kenya. Charles
Karanja was trained in Uganda as a civil engineer.
Such a background was quite unnecessary to the
leadership of the KTDA, but it did seem to shape
Karanja's ideas about public service and efficiency. In
all three of these cases professional identity gave these
men a strong commitment to the goals of the
organisations they headed and caused them to resist
their use for inappropriate personal gain by
themselves or others.
Simeon Nyachae was prepared to be a provincial
administrator, first by his father, Chief Nyandusi, and
then by training in Kenya and England. This
background gave him a very strong identification with
the state and a principled determination to serve the
interests of those who hold political power. In his
years as a Provincial Commissioner these values did
not give him a particularly strong commitment to the
goals of some of the organisations with which he was
involved, and he was willing to see them taxed to serve
the personal interests of those who held political
power over him. When he came onto the national
scene, however, Nyachae increasingly came to see the
interests of the 'nation', conceived in a conservative
sense, as coincident with the interests of his President,
the state, and the business class of which he was a part.
This broadening of vision gave him a set of values
which made him quite open to the policies advocated
by the economist Mule.
All four men were careful to place the interests of the
organisations that they served above their own pursuit
of personal gain. Although their conception of what
constitutes conflict of interest was more lax than those
applied in the United States today, they definitely had
one and adhered to it. They also differed among
themselves. Muriithi's and particularly Mule's personal
that international confidence. In a similar way, the
high regard with which he was held in international
veterinary circles helped him to bring the International
Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases' and
other, even more direct forms of donor assistance, to
Kenya.
Charles Karanja's reputation for efficient management
of the Kenya Tea Development Authority facilitated
its continued access to substantial amounts of
assistance, particularly from the World Bank, and
thus gave it the resources and flexibility to grow
beyond what Kenya's domestic capital constraints
would have allowed.6 The KTDA's size and
international reputation in turn gave Karanja weight
in many domestic policy struggles.
The only one of our four who was not particularly
gifted with the international community was Simeon
Nyachae. As a Provincial Commissioner, Nyachae
had been one of President Kenyatta's primary
instruments for the control of domestic politics see
Gertzel 19701. When Nyachae came to the national
policy scene he had very little international experience
and was tainted by his past political connections. He
and the donors didn't understand each other very well,
and they were not certain that they could trust him. It
was here that Nyachae's alliance with Mule was of
such great importance; just as Nyachae provided Mule
with political connections, Mule provided donor
access to Nyachae.
Africanisation
Frequently there was a down side to donor confidence,
one that reduced the loyalty that managers inspired in
their own staff. Three of the managers in our 'sample'
felt that they had to use some non-Kenyan staff in
order to maintain high professional standards in their
organisations, standards which gave them a strong
international reputation. The morale and allegiance of
their Kenyan staff depended, however, on a vigorous
Africanisation programme, replacing foreign with
local staff.
Only Charles Karanja handled this dilemma well. He
concentrated expatriate staff in training positions and
in those parts of the organisation where new functions
were being added. He was able to rally nationalist
sentiment for his personnel policies, despite the
continued use of foreigners, by externalising the
conflict. He argued that the important issue was not
the exact distribution of positions inside the
organisation but whether it would be the Kenyan-
6 The KTDA's access to Bank funds was aided by, but was not
dependent on Karanja's management. As Rwekaza Mukandala has
pointed out to me, other, less well managed tea authorities were
getting Bank monies at this time. Of course the popularity of tea as a
target of lending was due in large part to the KTDA's success, which
in turn was influenced by Karanja.
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Access to Donor Resources
Another attribute that proved critical to managerial
effectiveness was the ability to inspire the confidence
of international actors. African economies are
relatively small and weak, and international markets
and donor transfers are unusually important to them.
Those managers who are skilled at acquiring these
resources are able to use them to gain flexibility in an
environment that is usually severely constrained. They
also perform a function for the economy that gives
them support from other powerful domestic politicians
and public servants.
Harris Mule was particularly well known for his skill
with donors; this attribute was independently raised
by eight quite different interviewees. It is interesting
that whereas the foreigners tended to say that Mule
'gets along well with donors', one of the Kenyan
respondents said that 'he handles donors well', a subtle
but significant difference in perspective. Mule was
helpful in international economic negotiations because
he both understood donor objectives and was able to
make them in turn understand Kenyan political
constraints. Thus he was invaluable in advancing
some of the reforms that donors regarded as
important and in getting them to accept that others
were unachievable at the time. In this way he was
crucial to obtaining IMF, World Bank and bilateral
donor resources at critical junctures for the economy.
Mule's skill in this regard was immensely aided by and
may well have depended on his reputation for
professionalism and absolute personal integrity,
which made donors trust what he said. One donor
even funded a project in Mule's home area to reward
him for being incorruptible and thus unable to finance
any significant projects himself.
Ishmael Muriithi's professional reputation was
similarly responsible for inspiring international
confidence in Kenya and thus bringing it advantage.
In his case the critical problem was gaining access to
the lucrative European beef market, despite the
continued presence in Kenya of animal diseases such
as Foot and Mouth. European states usually prohibit
the import of fresh beef from any country in which
these diseases are identified. Kenya gained access to
some of the European market by arguing that it would
export beef only from zones which were kept free of
the offending diseases. For European veterinary
officials to accept this argument they had to be
convinced that Kenya would indeed enforce a rigid
quarantine on cattle movements into these zones, and
that only beef that came from these zones would be
cleared for export to Europe. To be so persuaded they
had to have confidence in the high standards and
integrity of Kenya's Veterinary Service. Muriithi's
reputation as Director for being incorruptible and
firmly committed to professional standards created
controlled KTDA or the multinational corporations
that would control critical aspects of the domestic tea
industry. For the technically demanding role of
factory manager, he was able to point out that the
multinationals did not believe it was possible for any
Kenyan African to do the job in the near future. Thus
when he hired an expatriate to head the factory
division and to train managers, he could argue that he
was promoting, not hindering Africanisation, and in
the process was able to unleash a nationalist
determination among his recruits to do their jobs well
and prove the multinationals wrong.
Ishmael Muriithi was not so adept. He was under great
pressure to replace expatriate veterinarians with
Kenyan ones as they became available. He argued that
this was a non-issue. As the country had a shortage of
vets anyway, both should be employed. But he also felt
that his highest priority was to assign African vets to
field positions, where they would be able to interact
with African livestock producers. This meant that he
was seen as keeping expatriates in the highly prized
headquarters positions. Consequently he developed a
reputation among his Kenyan staff for being
insufficiently attentive to their advancement, and lost
some of their loyalty. This was tragic, for the
circumstances actually closely parallel those in the
KTDA where Karanja was able to engender the extra
incentive of nationalist competition. The measure of
an 'Africaniser' may be as much subjective as
objective. The manager who is able to give reality to an
external promotion standard that he is helping his staff
to meet will out-perform one who is seen as being the
gate keeper himself.
Harris Mule also had trouble with Africianisation, a
problem which he inherited from his predecessor,
Philip Ndegwa. In Finance and Planning the
replacement of expatriates with locals in line positions
took place relatively rapidly, perhaps too rapidly. For
it was then felt that certain critical skills were still in
short supply, and foreign advisors were brought in to
provide them. Mule's Kenyan subordinates frequently
resented the influence that some of these advisors had,
and the fact that they often seemed to get the more
challenging work. There was something of a vicious
circle here, for as Kenyans grew discontented with
foreign advisors they sometimes became more lax in
their own work and the need for expatriates increased.
Something like Karanja's device for making this
competition functional rather than destructive was
needed.
Risk Taking
A further attribute that emerges from our case studies
is the willingness to take risks. All four men
occasionally faced circumstances in which they had to
put their own careers at stake by taking decisions or
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advocating policies which were critical to their
organisations. Karanja, Mule, and Nyachae were
willing to do so when they calculated that the political
odds gave them some chance of success, and they
usually won. Muriithi was a more classically
'conservative' bureaucrat, however, and his organi-
sation may have suffered at some critical junctures as a
result.
It is interesting to ask why these three managers were
willing to risk their careers. Karanja and Nyachae
both said that it was because they were already well to
do and had always intended to make their careers in
private business rather than the public sector anyway.
Mule had always been dedicated to a public career and
his personal property was quite modest, but he too felt
that his earning opportunities did not depend on his
continued government service. Since he had been
incorruptible, he could make more as a private or
international executive. Although I think that all three
men, in different ways, loved the exercise of power,
that love did not outweigh their drive to accomplish
certain goals that they had set for their organisations,
and they felt that they had the financial independence
to take that risk. Business or other executive positions
awaited them outside the public sector.
Paradoxically the fact that the Kenyan state does not
have a monopoly control over higher income earning
positions therefore seems to have given it better service
from its managers by making them less risk averse.
Muriithi's unwillingness to take the same risks as the
other three men may have been due to the extremely
limited possibilities for private veterinary practice in
Kenya which his own policies had helped to create.7
Drive
Finally and unsurprisingly, all four men had
extraordinary drive and an ability for hard work that
was sometimes of legendary proportions. They
worked exceedingly long hours and were extremely
self-disciplined. Mule read voraciously and into the
early hours of every morning. Nyachae began his day
early, worked through lunch, and kept to a rigid
schedule of exercise. He was famous for the speed with
which he gave written replies to memos. All four were
unusual in being extremely temperate in their
drinking, although Mule loved bars as a young man;
Nyachae believed in total abstinence from alchohol
and would not even drink coffee.
Conclusion
'Type A' personality attributes are a common part of
the folk-lore of executive success everywhere. People
As Emery Roe has pointed Out to me, these observations indicate
that the brain drain from the public to the private sector in Kenya at
least has some compensating advantages.
with exceptional careers are usually exceptional. Of
greater interest are the attributes of political
connections, professional competence and integrity,
access to donor resources, and skill at maintaining
staff quality and commitment through the trials of
Africanisation. We see that these attributes have a
distinctively African character that is consistent with
the universal tenets of organisation and social
exchange theories, but which could not have been
easily predicted from them. Much more work is
needed on this fascinating and important topic. I will
have more to say as I continue my analysis of my case
studies, and I hope that others will join mein research
in this area as well.
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